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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
roll was transmitted to the third auditor to be filed to await the
passage of an Act of Congress which should provide for the payment
of the fraudulent claims contained therein. It was not filed as a
claim against the United States; on the contrary, the. debt to the
persons named in the roll was the debt of the state, and would
remain such unless Congress should assume it. It could not be
known that such assumption would ever be made, or if made that
the said rolls would have any legal significance or value.
However fraudulent in ulterior design, or morally reprehensible,
the acts charged in the indictment may be, still our judgment is
that sect. 5440 of the-Revised Statutes cannot be extended to a
case where the fraud which the conspiracy contemplated can only
be effected in case an Act of Congress shall be thereafter passed of
a nature to fit the prior conspiracy and give it something to feed
upon. The demurrer to the indictment must be sustained.
KREKEL, J., concurred.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
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ACTION. See Sunday.
Founded on Act forbidden by Statute.-When a plaintiff's cause of
action arises from a violation of law on his part, his suit cannot be sus-
tained, and it is immaterial whether the violation of law appears from
the plaintiff's direct evidence, or is elicited from him by legitimate cross-
examination: Smith v. Rollins, 11 R. I.
Violatd6n of Munic!pal Ordinance.-The violation of a duty imposed
by a municipal ordinance, and sanctioned by a fine, will not support an
action on the case for special damages in favor of one injured by the
violation and against the violator: .eeney v. Sprague, 11 R. I.
I Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1877. The cases will probably be reported in 5 or 6 Otto.
2 From John Hooker, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 44 Connecticut Reports.
3 From Hon. W. C. Webb, Reporter; to appear in 18 or 19 Kansas Reports.
4 From G. D. W. Vroom, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 10 Vroom's Reports.
5 From Arnold Green, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 11 Rhode Island Reports.
6 From Hon. 0. M. Conover, Reporter ; to appear in 42 Wisconsin Reports.
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A municipal ordinance required the removal of snow, &c., from side-
walks, by the owner of the adjoining premises, and prescribed a penalty
for neglect. 11., being injured by a fall on a sidewalk, slippery with
snow which had not been removed, sued S., the owner of the adjoining
premises, claiming that S. was liable in damages to H. on account of
the violation of tile ordinance by S. Held, that the action would not
lie: Id.
ADMINISTRATOR. See Decedents' Estate.
AGENT. See Contract.
Contract under Seal in his own Nam.-An agreement for the pur-
chase and sale of realty was made between E. J. and M. of the first
part, and D., " in behalf of the city of Providence," of the second part.
It was signed by all the parties in their own names and sealed with their
own seals. On demurrer to a bill for specific performance filed by the
city of Providence : Ield, that the contract was that of D. personally,
and not that of the city : City of Providence v. Miller, 11 R. 1.
Held, further, that the words "in behalf of the city of Providence,"
though indicating a beneficial interest on the part of the city, neither
made it a party to the contract nor entitled it to sue as such : Id.
held, further, that the fact admitted at the hearing, though not charged
in the bill, that D. was mayor of the city of Providence when the contract
was made and signed, was unimportant: Id.
Semble, that the general rule, that a contract made by a public officer
in his official capacity in behalf of the public will not bind such officer
personally, does not apply to officers of a municipal corporation, which
can contract for itself and be sued on its contracts : .d.
Authority of-Acquescence by, may est'p _PrincfpaL.-M. gave B. a
power of attorney to lease his real estate, collect rents, and institute all
legal proceedings that he should think necessary. Under this power B.
had the care of certain premises leased by M. to T., the lease lill-iting
the use to the keeping of a lager beer saloon, and the lessee covenanting
to use the premises for no other purpose. During the term T., at con-
siderable expense, built a small kitchen in the rear, and fitted up a res-
taurant on the premises. B. knew of his expending money in the alter-
ation and made no objection until two months afterwards. Al. after-
wards brought a petition for an injunction to stop the use of the premises
by T. for a restaurant. Hel, 1. That if M. personally had known of
the outlay being made by T. and had made no objection, he would be
held to have assented to the new use of -the premises. 2. That B.,
under the power of attorney, so far represented M. that his knowledge
and acquiescence were the knowledge and, acquiescence' of N : Malley
v. Thalheimer, 44 Conn.
ARBITRATION.
Agreement for-Effect of-Where several persons enter into a written
contract, stipulating that each shall keep up his own cattle, and prevent
the same from trespassing upon or injuring the crops or hedges of any
of the others, for the period of three years, and that in case any injury
should occur by reason of the cattle of any one of said persons trespass-
ing upon the crops or hedges of any of the others, and in case the parties
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themselves could not agree upon the amount of the damages sustained,
then, that the question as to the amount of such damnages should be sub-
mitted to arbitrators, consisting of three of the signers to said contract,
one of such arbitrators t.) be selected by each of the parties, respectively,
and the third one to. be selected by the other two arbitrators, and that
the decision of such arbitrators should be final between the parties: ldd,
that such contract is valid and binding: Ber)y v. Garter, 18 or 19
Kans.
And in such a ease, where the cattle of B. (one of the parties to said
contract), trespasses upon the crops of 0. (another of the parties to said
contract), and injure said crops, and B., on the demand of C., refuses to
pay any damages, and refuses to recognise said contract as having any
force or validity: Held, that C. may immediately, and without offering
to submit the question of damages to arbitrators, commence an action
against B. for the aiount of such damages. B., by refusing to recognise
the validity of said contract, waives his right to have the amount of said
damages determined by arbitrators under the contract: Id.
And under said contract, it makes no difference, with reference to C.'s
right to recover, whether C.'s crops were fenced or not: Id.
Where B.'s cattle trespass upon the crops of C. and C.'s cattle upon
the crops of B., these mutual trespasses do not in and of theuselves
rescind or destroy said contract, or render any of its stipulations inoper-
ative : Id.
And where C.'s cattle trespass upon the crops of B., and B. does not
claim that his crops were fenced, or that C. drove his cattle on to said
crops, or that B. was willing or that C. was unwilling to submit the
question of damages to arbitrators under the contract; hehl, that B.
has no cause of action against C. for said damages ; that before B. can
have a cause of action against C. in such a case, he must be willing and
C. unwilling to submit the question of damages to arbitrators in accord-
ance with said contract: Id.
ATTORNEY. See .Yortyage:
Communications between Clent and-Privilege -On the trial of a
defendant charged with the crime of bigamy, the defendant testifying in
his own behalf, was required by the court to answer on cross-examination
the following question : "If he had not consulted or been advised by his
counsel in regard to obtaining a copy of a decree of divorce alleged to
have been granted prior to the second marriage ?" against thcobjection of
the defendant that the communications between himself and his attorneys
were privileged. field, the court erred, as the defendant had not re-
ferred to any consultation or advice in connection with his attorneys in
his direct examination, and that the communications were privileged:
Held, also, that all communications which an attorney is precluded by
statute from disclosing, his client cannot be compelled to disclose against
his objection of privilege : State v. Wtite, 18 or 19 Kans.
BILLS AND NOTES. See .3funicipal Bonds.
Dilience in Presentation-Butrden of Proof-Parol Evidence to affect
Liability.-In an action by the endorsee against the endorser of a pro-
missory note, which was not presented to the maker for payment at
maturity, the burden is upon the plaintiff to show that the maker had
182 .ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
then removed from the state, or that due diligence was used to find him
or ascertain his place of residence: Eaton v. McMahon, 42 Wis.
The endorser cannot show, against the endorsee, a parol agreement
between them at the time of the endorsement, that the same should be
without recourse: 1d.
CHARITY.
Uncertainty.-A will, havinig created a trust, and given sundry legacies
under the trust, made the following provision with regard to the residue:
"It is my will that said trustee shall dispose of such remainder for any
and all benevolent purposes -that he may see fit." Held to be void for
uncertainty: Adye v. Smith, 44 Conn.
It does not help the will in' such a case for the trustee to designate
certain charitable purposes to which he proposes to apply the property.
The question is not whether the trustee may apply the estate to such
purposes, but whether he is bound to do so: Id.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.
Comity-Effect given to Foreign Laws.-The plaintiff, a citizen of
Rhode Island, attached in this state a debt due, from a resident of this.
state to a corporation located in the state of Pennsylvania. Previous to
the attachment the corporation had gone into insolvency under the in-
solvent laws of that state, and had under those laws made an assignment
ofall its effects to a trustee for the benefit of its creditors, and notice of
the assignment had been given to the Connecticut debtor. fieldi that
the trustee in insolvency did not acquire a title to the debt that was
good against the attachment: Paine v. Lester, 44 Conn.
The givipg effect in this state to the laws of a sister state or foreign
country, in the case of the transfer of or succession to personal property
within the limits of the state, is wholly an act of comity, and not a
recognition of a right : Id.
This comity our courts will extend where there is no interest of our
own citizens, or of the citizens of other states who are seeking to avail
themselves of the benefit of our laws, to be injuriously affected by it: Id.
Where such interests exist, the courts owe a legal duty to the parties
so interested, which is more imperative than the demands of mere comity:
dThe citizens of other states coming into this state to avail themselves
of our laws for the protection of their rights are, by the constitution of
the United States, entitled to the same *aid from our courts that one of
our own citizens would be entitled to: .id.
CONSPIRACY. See Criminal Law.'
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Taxation.
Cor:poration-Contracts by State-Repeal or Alteration of-Taxa-
tion.-A statute of a state which declares that all charters of corpora-
tions granted after its passage may be altered, amended or repealed by
the legislature, does not necessarily apply to supplements to a charter
already passed, though the supplement be subsequent to the statute :
The State of New Jersey, The Morris and Essex Railroad Co. v. Jas.
S. Yard, Commissioner of Railroad Taxation of the State of New Jer-
sey, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
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Nor does a provision in a supplement to the charter, which says that
if this supplement. and the charter to which it is a supplement, may be
altered or amended by the legislature," apply to a contract with the
company made in a supplement passed'long after: Id.
Such reservations of the right to repeal found in statutes, unlike sim-
ilar provisions in the constitution of a state, are only binding on succeed-
ing legislatures so far as they choose to adopt them, and a legislative
contract may be made which is not repealable if the legislature so intend.
It is, therefore, in every case a question whether the legislature making
the contract intended that the former provision for repeal or amendment
should become a part of the new contract by implication : Id.
In this case the contract for a specific rate of taxation was inconsistent
with any such implication, because,
1. There was a subject of dispute and a fair adjustment of the contro-
versy for a valuable consideration on both sides.
2. The contract assumed, by the requirements of the legislation, the
shape of a formal written contract signed by both parties.
3. The terms of the contract, that 1" this tax shall be in lieu and. sat-
isfactioa of all other taxation or imposition whatsoever by or under the
authority of this state or any law thereof," when viewed in the light of
the whole transaction, do not admit the idea of the right of the state to
revoke it at pleasure : Id.
CONTRACT. See Constitutional Law.
Work to be satisfactory to one Part1 -Agent.-The plaintiff, a sculptor,
made a plaster bust of the deceased husband of the defendant, under an
agreement that she was not to be bound to take it unless she was satisfied
with it. When it was finished she was not satisfied with it and refused
to accept it. In a suit for the price agreed it was found that the bust
was a fine piece of work, a correct copy of a photograph furnished by
the defendant, and that it accurately portrayed the features of its subject:
and that the only fimult found with it was that it did not have the express-
ion of the deceased when living, which was caused by no imperfection
in the work but by the nature of the material. fIeld, that the plaintiff
was not entitled to recover: Zaleski v. Clark, 44 Conn.
As the bust was to be satisfactory to the defendant, it was for her
alone to determine whether it was so, and it was not enough that her
dissatisfaction was unreasonable: d
The order for the bust was procured by a third person, who had a gen-
eral authority to solicit orders for the plaintiff, but none to make such a
condition. Held, 1. That such a general authority would seem to be
sufficient to authorize the agent to agree upon the terms of the contract.
2. But that, if the authority was not sufficient, the result would be that
there was no special contract, and as the defendant had not accepted the
bust there was no sale, and no liability on the part of the defendant : Id.
CORPORATION. See Constitutional Law.
Powers of.-There is a material difference between such an artificial
creation as a corporation and a natural person. The latter can do any-
thing not forbidden by law. The former can do only what is authorized
by its charter. Where several corporations. existing by virtue of sep-
arate charters, are consolidated by a new charter, the old corporations
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cease to exist and the new one commences its existence with only such
powers as its own charter gives it. It takes nothing by transmission
from any of the old corporations out of which it was created, except so
far as the new charter by express terms or necessary implication adopts
and renews them: Shields v. State of Ohio, S. U. U. S., Oct. Term
1877.
When. iStock-holder may bring Suit for the Cdrporation-Release of
Fraud of Officer.-In case a corporation on request refuses or neglects
to bring suit against a defaulting officer, such suit may be-brought by a
stockholder for himself and his co-stockholders, making the corporation
a party respondent: Hazard v. Durant, 11 R. I.
A corporation cannot gratuitously condone or release the fraud -of a
defrauding officer, except by a unanimous vote of its stockholders: Id.
CRIMINAL LAW. See Forcible Entry.
Lotteries.-" Auction pools," "French pools" apd 11 combinatio n
pools," upon horse-races, are lotteries within the New Jersey Crimes Act:
State v. Lorell, 10 Vroom.
0onsiracy-Partnershij.-A combination between one member of a
partnership and a third person, to issue and put in circulation the notes
of the firm, drawn by such partner for the purpose of paying ig indi-
vidual debts, the intention of the combination being fraudulent, is an
indictable conspiracy: State v. Cole, 10 Vroom.
Violation of Statutory .Duty by Public Officer.-Where a stattite.
specifically defines what acts shall constitute a misdemeanor, it is suffi-"
cient in the indictment to bring the defendant within the statutory
description of the crime. The distinction is between cases where a
legislative net forbids a ministerial officer to do an act. which, by reason
of such prohibition, becomes indictable at common law, and cases wheie
the statute declares what shall be indictable In the former case, under
the connon law, allegation of corrupt intent or guilty knowledge is
essential in the indictment; in the latter it is otherwise: State v.
Halsted, 10 Vroom.
Ignorance of the law is no excuse for crime. The case of State v.
Cutter, 7 Vroom 125, distinguished: Id.
Violation of Statutory Duty by Public Officer-In tent.-Section 159 of
the charter of Jersey City (Laws 1871, p 1160) forbids an board or
department of the city Aovernment to make a contract for work or ma-
terials without previous advertisement for proposals, with certain excep-
tions. Ifel, that although this section does not make the breach of its
terms a crime, it is indictable: State v. Startip et cd, 10 Vroom.
The violation of a prescribed public duty by a ministerial officer is
indictable, without being made so in terms by statute : 11.
In the absence of express words in the statute making the act crim-
inal, the indictment must charge that the offence was committed with
an evil intent or wilfully: Id.
The indictment should negative provisoes in the statute which consti-
tute exceptions to the duty imposed: Id.
Where an indictment eharges a crime, made such by statute, it is
sufficient to charge it in the words of the statute, without a particular
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statement of facts and circumstances, when the offence is thereby
deseribed without ambiguJity and uncertainty, or there may be such a
particular btatement of facts as will bring the accused within its opera-
tion. Id.
A clear legal intent, by a repeal of the act imposing a penalty or con-
stituting a crime, or some other expressed purpose, is necessary to annul
a penalty or condone a crime : Id.
DAMAGES. See Jlfaster and Servant.
DECEDENTS' ESTATE.
Agreement o] Administrator not binding on Estate- Wil.-An admin-
istrator is merely the agent or trustee of the estate of the decedent, act-
ing immediately under the direction of the law prescribing his duties,
regulating his conduct and limiting his powers : Golla"wre v. Wilder,
18 or 19 Kans.
An agreement between a creditor of an estate and the administrator
thereof, to the effect that no further action should be had in Kansas
towards the establishment of a demand of the creditor, beyond legally
exhibiting to said administrator said claim, until the determination of a
suit pending in another state, on the same claim against the executor of
the same estate, and that the determination of said suit. in such other
stats should settle the matter here, is not binding on the estate, nor on
the heirs of said estate : Id.
The formal and general language in a will requiring that all the just
debts of a decedent should be paid by his executors out of his estate,
cannot be successfully invoked in behalf of a person, who, having a just
claim against such testator, neglects the legal proof of his demand until
more than three years have elapsed after the issuanice of letters testamen-
tary and the estate has been finally settled according to" the provisions
of law, and the administration closed: Id.
DEED.
Esrow-Requisites of.-The conditions upon which an escrow was to
be delivered to the grantee therein named, may rest in and be proved by
parol : 0'wnpbell v. Thomas, 42 Wis.
Where the grantor in the deed retains the right of control over it,
notwithstanding its deposit with a third person with instructions to de-
liver it to the grantee upon his compliance with specified conditions, it
is not an escrow : Id.
The mere facts that such deposit was made in pursuance of a previous
oral agreement between the grantor and the grantee for a sale of the
laud (void by the Statute of Frauds), and that a small part of the agreed
price was paid at the time of such agreement, will not deprive the
grantor of his right of control over the deed : Id.
Such a deposit makes the deed an escrow, 1. Where there is a prior
valid contract between the parties named in the deed, for the sale of
the land. 2. Where the delivery of the deed to the depositary itself
passes title to the grantee, as where the condition of its delivery to him
by the depositary is a future certain event, and the grantee assents to
the first delivery: Id.
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DOWER.
Lands aliened by Husband- Time at which Value to be determined.-
When dower is to be assigned in estates aliened by the husband, the
widow is to be endowed according to their value at the time of the assign-
ment, deducting the enhancement by the purchaser's improvements, but
allowing for all other increase in value: Descott v. Campbell, 11 R. I.
A., whose husband died in 1863, claimed dower'in a mill estate alien-
ated by him some years before. In 1871, the mill, being fully insured,
was burned down, and was rebuilt in 1873. Held, that she was entitled
to dower in the value of the estate at the time of the dower assignment;
that she must suffer the depreciation of value by the fire; and that she
was not entitled to d,,wer in the value given to the estate by the rebuild-
ing: Id.
EASEMENT.
Evidene- Claim of Righlt.-Upon the question whether a certain
alley-way, which had long been used in connection with a dwelling-house
on which it abutted, had been acquired by adverse possession: Held,
that a claim of right made while using the alley by a former owner of
the house from whom the present claimant derived title, though inad-
missible as a claim of right, was yet admissible as giving character to
the use of the alley and showing it to have been adverse ; Turner v.
Baldwin, 44 Conn.
EQUITY. See Municpal Corporation.
NArature of Cross-Bill-Appeal from final Decree.-Both the original
and cross-bill constitute one suit and ought to be heard at the same time.
Consequently any decision or decree in the proceedings upon the cross-
bill is not a final decree in the suit and not the subject of an appeal.
The decree, whether maintaining or dismissing the bill, disposes of a pro-
ceeding simply incidental to the principal matter in litigation, and can
only be reviewed on an appeal from the final decree disposing of the
whole case. That appeal brings up all the proceedings for re-examina-
tion, when the party aggrieved by any determination in respect to the
cross-bill has the opportunity to review it, as in the ease of any other
interlocutory proceeding in the case : Ex parte North and South Ala-
bama Railroad Co., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
A cross-bill must grow out of the matters alleged in the original bill,
and is used to bring the whole dispute before the court, so that there
may be a complete decree touching the subject-matter of the action : Id.
Reformation of Deed-Rights of Third Persons acquired in good faith
not affected.-In 1866 the appellee, Montgomery, being indebted to
Estlin & Co., made promissory notes to his own order, and payable respect-
ively, one, two, three, four and five years from date, with interest until
paid, endorsed them in blank and secured them by a deed of trust of
certain lands therein described. He delivered the notes so endorsed
and the debd of trust to Estlin & Co. They transferred the notes in
the course of business to other parties. Portions of them were held by
each of the several complainants, whose bill was filed to enforce the deed
of trust. The defendants in their answers set up another deed of trust exe-
cuted by Montgomery in 1848, to secure certain other liabilities of his,
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therein set forth. The lands covered by this deed of trust were described
as in range nine, while all those except one tract embraced in the other
deed were described as in range eight. With this exception, the
description in the earlier deed applied to the lands described in the
later one. The defendants insisted that the number of the range in the
first deed was a mistake of the scrivener who drew it, that the number
was intended to be eight instead of nine, and they insisted that the
instrument should be reformed accordingly, and that the liabilities in-
tended to be secured by it should be made the first lien upon those prem-
ises. There was neither allegation nor proof that the complainants or the
other holders of the notes delivered to Estlin & Co. had any notice of
the alleged mistake when they took the paper, nor was there any aver-
ment or proof of such notice to the trustee-when the deed was delivered.
Held, that as between Montgomery, the grantor in the prior deed, and
the cestui lue trust under that deed, the deed might have been reformed
and enforced as corrected, but this could not be done against the inter-
vening rights of others acquired in good faith: New Orleans Canal
and Banking Co. et al. v. .Montgome-. et al., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term
1877.
EsToPPEL.
Who many take advantage of.-Where a declaration is made to one
person for the purpose of influencing his conduct, and though not con-
fidential is not intended for others, a bystander who overhears it and
acts upon it cannot set up an estoppel against the party making the
dealaration: Kinney v. Whiton, 44 Conn.
EVIDENCE. See Bils and Notes; Easement.
Parol, to affect Writing.-AWhen a contract is first made by parol for
the sale and purchase of a horse, and a paper subsequently drawn up
and signed by the agent of the vendor, not as containing the terms of
the contract, but being on its face and plainly intended to be nothing
more than a receipt for the purchase-money, parol evidence is admissible
of representations as to the soundness of the horse, made by the agent
of the vendor at the time o" the sale: Perrine v. Cooley, 10 Yroom.
F RCIBLE ENTRY.
What may anzount to.-A., with the aid of six or eight men, hastily
tore down a part of the fences around a lot which had been for a year
and a half in the peaceable possession and occupation of B., and with
great haste moved thereon a shop in the absence of B. and his family
from his premises, and without personal violence or intimidation toward
any person, but without the consent of B.: .Held, that the jury were
warranted in finding a forcible eatry: Steilein v. Halstead, 42 Wis.
B. afterwards went to the shop, which was occupied by A., with several
workmen, and informed A. that he had taken possession unlawfully, and
requested him to remove without delay; and A. answered that "no one
could get him away unless he were forced to go by law." Ifeld, that
this language imported that A. would resist by force all attenpts to
remove him except through legal process ; and warranted the jury in
finding a forcible detainer. Carter v. VanDorn, 36 Wis. 289, dis-
tinguished: Id.
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FOREIGN JUDGMENT.
Attestation of-Act of (ongrss.-It seenis that the attestation of a
foreign record, under section 9U5 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States, must be made by the clerk in person and cannot be made by a
deputy or other person acting as a substitute for him : K. P. 1?ailway
Co. v. Gltter, Admx., 18 or 19 Kans.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OP. See Sale.
HARBOR LINE. See Waters.
HIGHWAY. See Action; .Muicipal Corporation.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Crant includes purchase byt Bargain and Sale - 7-'resum ption as to
Wife's Estate.-In the statute which declares that a married woman
" may receive by inheritance, or by gift, grant, devise or bequest, from any
person other than her husband, and hold to her sole and separate use,"
real and personal property (R. S., ch. 95, seet. 3), the word grant includes
deeds of bargain and sale of land: .Mc1'ey/ v. G. B. & Minn. Railway
Go., 42 Wis.
Where a conveyance is made by a stranger to a married woman, the
presumption, in the absence of proof, is that the consideration was paid
by her and not by her husband: Id.
Divorce-Insanit.-Insanity. occurring after marriage, is not cause
for divorce, and nothing which is a consequence of it can be, and, ileld,
that neither is impotency caused by such insanity, nor extreme cruelty,
while so insane, ground for divorce : Powell v. Powell, 18 or 19 Kans.
A marriage with an insane person is absolutely void, for want'of suf-
ficient mental capacity on the part of such insane person to consent to
the marriage: Id.
If a marriage is void by reason of the insanity of either of the con-
tracting parties, while no judgment annulling such marriage as void ab
initio is necessary to restore the parties to their original rights, yet a
sentence of nullity in such a case is conducive to good order and decorum,
and to the peace and conscience of the party seeking it : 11.
INSANITY. See HIusband and Wfe; Insurance.
INSURANCE.
Defence to Policy-Insanit.-It is not every kind or degree of in-
sanity which will so far excuse the party taking his own life as to make
the company insuring liable; to do this, the act of se]l-destruction must
have been the consequence of insanity, and' the mind of the deceased
must have been so far deranged as to have made him incapable of using
a rational judgment in regard to the act which he was committing. If
he was impelled to the act by an insane impulse, which the reason that
was left him did not enable him to resist, or if his reasoning powers
were so far overthrown by his mental condition that he could not exer-
cise his reasoning faculties on the act which he was about to do, the
company is liable. On the other hand, there is no presumption of law,
prima facie or otherwise, that self destruction arises from insanity:
Charter Oak .Lf .Insurance Co. v. Rodel, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877,
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MANDA-MUS.
.Not available to enforce Contract Rights of Private .Nhature.-A writ
of mandamus is not an appropriate remedy for thc enforcement of con-
tract rights of a private nature: Parrott v. City of Bridgeport, 44 Conn.
It is granted only to prevent a failure of justice in cases where ordi-
nary legal processes furnish no relief: 11.
The writ refused where applied for to compel a city to construct a
public street (which had been laid out, but not opened) in a certain
special manner, not required by law, but which it was averred had been
agreed to by the city and taken into consideration in the assessment of
the petitioner's damages and benefits: Id.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
Violation of Duty by &ervant.-If a servant, without his master's
consent, engage in any employment or business for himself or another,
which may tend to injure the master's trade or business-as in one
which brings him in direct competition with the master, giving him a
hostile interest-lie may lawfully be discharged before the expiration
of the agreed term of service, even though he may so conduct such
other business, by agents or otherwise, that it does not interfere with
the time and attention due the business of his employer: Dieringer v.
letyers, 42 Wis.
Liability of Master for Torts of Servant- Railroad-Exemplarfy
Damages.-A principal is liable in compensatory damages for injuries
done by his servant acting within the scope of his employment; and if
the act is such that the servant would be liable in punitory damages, if
the action were against him, the principal is liable in damages of that
character in ease he authorized the act or subsequently ratified it, but
not otherwise : Bass v. The G. & IV. W. Railway Co., 42 Wis.
Where a railroad company retained a brakeman in its service, and
even promoted him to a position of greater responsibility, after notice
of tortious acts committed by him against a passenger, for which he
would be liable in punitory damages, there was no error in subnitting
to the jury, in an action against the comnany, the question whether it
had ratified such acts : I .
Plaintiff was a passenger upon a train or the defenaant company, and
there being no vacant seat in any passenger car, except the smoking
car and the rear or ladies' car, he entered the latter peaceably, without
being forbidden or barred from entering it by any officer or agent of the
company; while lie was there, and while the train was in motion, a
brakeman seized him, and without requesting him to leave the car, or
offering him a seat elsewhere, forcibly ejected him from the car upon
the platform thereof in a rude and violent manner, though without any
intent to inflict bodily injury upon him, and using no more force than
was necessary to get him out of the car. Held, that the injury was one
which, in an action against the brakeman, would sustain a verdict for
punitory damages: Mi.
In case of the misconduct of a brakeman toward a passenger on a rail-
road train, immediate' notice to the conductor of the train (by whomso-
ever given) is notice to the company; and if the conductor or other
officer of the company, after such notice, disbelieves the charge made
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against the brakeman, still the retention of the latter in, its service by
the company will be at its peril of the fact : 11.
An award of $2500 for compensatory damages in this case, held (es-
pecially in view of the former verdicts herein), not to be so dispropor-
tioned to the injury sustained as to bear marks of passion, prejudice,
partiality or corruption in the jury, and therefore not to be excessive
Id.
MORTGAGE.
Rey)levht by1 Mortgagee for Chattels severed from the Realty.-A mort-
gagee of real estate whose debt is due, but who has not entered into
possession, cannot maintain repleyih for a specific chattel, which the
mortgagor or his assigns has severed and removed from the realty, and
which, before severance, was a fixture or part of the realty and subject
to the mortgage : Kircher v. Schalk, 10 Vroom.
Future-acguired Chattels.-A mortgage of personal property to be sub-
sequently acquired conveys no title to such property, when acquired
which is valid against the mortgagor or his voluntary assignee, unless
after acquisition possession of such property is given to the mortgagee
or taken by him under the mortgage: Williams v. Brigs, 11 R. I.;
Cook v. Corthlll, Id.
Although a mortgage of personal property to be subsequently acquired
is in itself ineffectual to vest in the mortgagee a legal title to the pro-
perty, yet if, after acquisition by the mortgagor, the mortgagee, by
delivery from, or by consent of, the mortgagor, takes possession of the
property under the mortgage conveyance, the title to the property, both
in law and equity, vests in the mortgagee without further conveyance
or bill of sale: .d.
Attorne Fee for Collection.-A mortgage contained a stipulation that
upon default in the payment of the debt the mortgage should be "sub-
ject to foreclosure according to law, and that an attorney's fee of fifty
dollars for foreclosure, with costs of suit and accruing costs, should be
taxed against the mortgagor: Held, that where, after suit brought, but
before decree, the mortgagor paid the debt, interest and costs, the court
committed no error in refusing to render judgment in favor of the mort-
gagee and against the mortgagor fbr the fifty dollars attorney fee or any
part thereof, or in dismissing the action. Life Association v. Dale, 17
Kans. 185, distinguished: Jennings v. MeKay et al, 18 or 19 Kans.
MUNICIPAL BONDS.
When negotiable.-Bonds and other securities issued by municipal
corporations under legislative authority, as a means of raising money on
a credit, and designed to be put in the market, and go into circulation,
by commercial usage have obtained the quality and attributes of com-
mercial paper, in respect of their transfer, among which is immunity, in
the hands of bona fide holders, from defences to which they would be
subject in the hands of the original parties : Knapp v. Mayor and Coun-
cil of loboken, 10 Yrooni.
B~ut ordinary corporation orders, warrants and certificates of indebt-
edness, whichare merely evidences of indebtedness or obligations to pay,
are not within this principle. If negotiable in form, they are negotiable
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in character, so far as to enable the holder to sue in his own name, but
they are not commercial or negotiable paper in the hands of holders,
so as to exclude inquiry into the legality of their issue, or preclude de-
fences thereto: Id.
A municipal corporation has no power to invest its obligations with
the character and incidents of commercial paper, so as to render them
unassailable by defences to which they would be subject in the hands of
the immediate parties, unless such power is conferred by legislative au-
thority, cither express or clearly implied: Md.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See Action; Agent.
Negligence-Ice on Highway.-A city held liable for an injury from
the slippery condition of a sidewalk by reason of ice upon it, where the
city had been guilty of negligence in the care of the walk: Dooley Y.
City of MAferiden, 44 Conn.
OPening Streets-Damage to Property-Equity.-The duty on the.
part of a city of opening a public street, carries with it the right to de-
termine the grade of the street and the manner of constructing it: Bel-
lowes v. City of .eo Haven, 44 Conn.
With the exercise by the city authorities of their discretion in the
matter no other triburial has any right to inferfere, so long as they keep
within the limits of their powers: 1.
If, in such a case, private property is incidentally damaged, the party
injured may or may not be entitled to compensation, according to the
circumstances; but such damage, unless possibly in extreme cases,
affords no reason for the interference of a court of equity : Id.
Where a city, in the discharge of a duty imposed by law, has by ad-
verse proceedings taken land for a public street and paid the damages
legally assessed, it is not liable for an injury incidentally and necessarily
caused to the adjoining land by the grading and working of the street
in a proper manner: Id.
it is presumed in such a case that the city, in taking and paying for
the land for a street, took, as an incident, a right to establish the grade
according to its own judgment, and to bring the street to that grade,
without further compensation : id.
Grade of Streets-Liability for Damages to adjacent Owners.-The
doctrine that a municipality cannot be held liable for the consequences
of an act which it is legally authorized or is required to perform, will
not justify an invasion of private property, even if the invasion is only
consequential : Inman v. Trip, 11 R. I.
The city of Providence, required by statute to keep its streets in good
repair and authorized for this purpose to grade them and to change their
grades, to make culverts, and to build drains and sewers, so changed the
grade of certain streets as to allow surface water, which formerly flowed
in other streets, and other surface water, which was formerly ponded at
some distance from the plaintiff's estate, to run down the street whereon
his estate fronted and thence on to his estate and into his cellar and
well. Reld, that the city was liable for the damages thus caused to the
plaintiff: Id.
1e'ld, further, that the plaintiff's right of action did not arise from
the mere change of grade in the highway, but from the injury suffered
in and on his estate resulting from such change : Jd.
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field, further, that though the act of changing grades or providing
sewers, or refusing to change them or to provide them, may involve a dis-
cretion, yet that this is not a sufficient defence to an action against the
city when private property has been invaded and its use impaired with-
out compensation : .d.
NEGLIGENCE. See Municipal Corporation; Railroad.
OFFIcER. See Criminal Law.
PARTNERSHIP. See Criminal Law.
RAILROAD. See Master and Servant.
Negligence-Dutty of approaching Wagon.-If a railroad crosses a
common road on the same level, those travelling on either have a legal
right to pass over the point of crossing, and to require due care on the
part of those travelling on the other to avoid a collision : Continental
Improvement Co. v. Stead, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
From the character and momentum of a railroad train and the require-
ments of public travel by means thereof, it cannot be expected that it shall
stop and give precedence to an approaching wagon to make the crossing
first; it is the duty of the wagon to wait for the train. The train has
the preference and right of way. But it is bound to give due warning
of its approach, so that the wagon may stop and allow it to pass, and to
use every exertion to stop if the wagon is inevitably in the way: Id.
REcouPMENT.
Sealed Instrument.-There can be no recoupment in a suit on a sealed
instrument: Price's "Executors v. Reynolds, 10 Vroom.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
Jurisdiction of Federal Coorts-Citizenship of Parties.-Where the
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States depends upon the citizen-
ship of the parties it has reference to the parties as persons. A petition
for removal must, therefore, state the personal citizenship of the parties
and not their official citizenship, if there can be such a thing: Amory
v. Arory, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 187'7.
A petition for removal, therefore, setting forth "that said plaintiffs, as
such executors, are citizens of the state of New York," is clearly insuf-
ficient: Id.
Time when Citizensh ris to he determined.-.The citizenship of the
parties upon which the right of removal depends nieanrs the citizenship
of the parties at the time of the commencement of the suit: Pioenix
ins. Co. v. Pechner, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
This right of removal is statutory. Before a party can avail himself
of it. he must show upon the record that his is a case which comes with-
in the provisions of the statute. His petition for removal when filed
becomes a part of the record in the cause. It should state facts which,
taken in connection with such as already appear, entitle him to the
transfer: id.
REPLEVIN. See Mortgage.
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R IARIAN RIGiTS. See 1'Waters.
'SALE
Goods ordered by one Partyfor anothr.-Where one person orders
goods for another, promising to pay fbr them, the question to which of
the parties they were sold, is wholly one of fhct: Spurr v. (ioJlingy 44
Conn.
Rescission-Statute of Frauds.-A party has no power to rescind a
contract of purchase unless there is a provision in it giving him the
right to do so. If the property purchased does not answer the terms
of the contract, there being no fraud in the case, his only remedy is by
a suit for the breach of the contract: Buckbigham v. Osborne, 44 Conn.
Where a contract of sale of personal property is inoperative under
the Statute of Frauds for want of delivery, a tender made afterwards,
and an unconditional acceptance, have'the same effect between the par-
ties as if the delivery had been made at the time of the sale : Id.
STATUTE. See Crinmial Law.
When Tentedy given byl is exclusive.-When a statute creates a new
right or liability, and at the same time gives a remedy, the remedy given
is exclusive ; but when the right or liability was not created by the
statute, but would have existed without, the statute, the statute remedy
is cumulative: Inman v. Tripp, 11 R. I.
STREET. See Mandamus ; I1finicl2al Coi:pration.
SUNDAY.
Action growing out of Illegal Contract -A statute being in force and
providing that " every person who shall do or exercise any labor or
business, or work of his ordinary calling, * * * on the first day of the
week, or suffer the same to be done * * by his children, servant or
apprentices, works of necessity and charity only excepted, shall be fined
not exceeding." * * * S., a livery stable keeper, let, in his ordinary
business, a horse and carriage to be driven for pleasure to a particular
place. The hirer drove them to a different place, and returned them
damaged; whereupon S. brought trover against the hirer: lehl,
affirming Wlielden v. Chappel, 8 F. I. 230, that the action would not
lie : Smith v. Rollins, 11 R. I.
TAXATION. See Constitutional Law.
Constitutionality of-Due Process of Law.-The constitutional provis-
ion that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, does not require that persons taxed by the
law of the state shall be present, or have an opportunity to be present,
when the tax is assessed against them : McMillen v. Anderson, S. C. U.
S., Oct. Term 1877.
Nor does it require that taxes shall be collected by a judicial proceed-
in- :d
A statute which gives the taxpayer I right to enjoin its collection,
and have the validity of the tax decided by a court of justice, is due
process of law. notwithstanding it requires the party to give security in
advance, as iu other injunction cases: Id.
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TORT. See Master and Servant.
TRADE MARK.
ULse of Party's own NAame cannot be enjoined unless Praudulent-As-
sign meat oJ' ame.-A. C. & Co., being the successors by purchase of
Stillman & Co., woollen manufacturers, continued to use " Stillman &
Co." as a trade-mark on their ticket for goods. Latimer, Stillman &
Co., the lessees of a mill formerlyused by Stillman & Co., known both
as the " Stillman Mill" and as the "Seventh Day Mill," also used "Still-
man & Co." as a trade-mark. On a petition for injunction, brought by
A. C. & Co. against Latimer, Stillman & Co., to prevent their so using
the words I- Stillman &,Co.," it appearing that no deception could be
charged to either complainants or respondents, and that no person of the
old firm of Stillman & Co. was a member of the firm of A. C. & Co.
eld, that the injunction could not be granted : Carnichel v. Latiner,
11 R. I.
fheld, further, that a manufacturer has the right to label his goods
with his own name or that of his mill, if no fraudulent purpose is in-
tended : Id.
Qur'y. If a trade-mark whose reputation depends on the excellence
of the manufacture, or the skill and honesty of the manufacturer, can be
legally assigned? Ad.
Qe1ner. If the English practice of retaining a firm n ime, when no
original partner remains, is generally recognised in Ameri an law? Id.
TRIAL.
Practice-Reading Law Books to Jury.-Upon an appeal from a
probate decree disallowing a will, the question being.whether the testa-
trix was of sound mind, the party upholding the will was allowed by the
court, against objection taken, to read to the jury from books cases de-
cided in other states and in England, for the purpose of showing that
the facts set forth in such cases were not inconsistent with the soundness
of mind necessary to the making of a valid will. Held, to be error, and
a ground for granting a new trial: Baldwin's Appeal, 44 Conn.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.
ITarbor Line- Title to Land below High-water .Aark.-Land border-
ing on tide-water was platted into house lots,.some of which extended
below low-water mark, all the lots being defined shoreward by a fixed
line, outside of which no lots were platted. Conveyance of these lots
was made, and subsequently a harbor line was fixed by the state, running
in front of the lots. Held, on a trustee's bill for instructions : 1. That
the fee of the soil below high-water mark was in the statd; 2. That the
establishment of a harbor line was permission given by the state to fill
out to it; 3. That a grantee of a lot touching tide-water who fills out to
the harbor line holds the filled land, not under his grantor, but directly
from the state; 4. That the land between high-water mark and any lot
not touching high-water mark, with the right to fill to the harbor line,
did not pass by the conveyance made: Bailey v. Burges, 11 R. I.
